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Abstract
Is ‘remembering’ an intentional activity, residing in the subject’s autonomy,
or does it belong to the realm of receptivity, interrupting the subject? Or
is it both at once? This jointly authored paper sets these questions in the
context of a recently renewed interest in memoria in cultural theory and
the humanities, as well as of an increasing pluralism in Western societies. The
impossibility of sharing memories as a common good and a common truth
is explored by putting the theme of historical responsibility, to which every
gesture of memoria is tied, in a new light. The paper ﬁrst demonstrates that
the concept of performativity, as developed in particular by Jacques Derrida
through a critical reading of Austin and Searle, can be a fruitful theoretical
model in the analysis of memoria and of its double status: active and receptive
at the same time. A reﬂection on the practice of testimony, again starting from
Derrida, will further articulate this coherence between performativity and
memoria. After this theoretical clariﬁcation, the value of performativity as a
model for memoria will be tested through a detailed reading of the German
writer W.G. Sebald’s (1944–2001) story ‘Max Ferber’, focussing on the
delicate way this story stages an impossible testimonial drama. The authors
will, ﬁnally, enquire as to the relevance of the performative model for a
theological view of memoria and testimony.
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Zersto¨ret das Letzte die Erinnerung nicht—W.G. Sebald
(freely rendered from Ho¨lderlin1)
I . OPEN ING: MEMORIA BETWEEN ACTIV ITY
AND RECEPT IV ITY
WHAT IS it to remember? What to commemorate and memorialise? What
is memory? What, in short, is memoria, as the overarching concept that
covers all these terms? These questions immediately lead to a further question,
a fairly formal but not unimportant one: is memoria something that one ‘does’,
or does it happen to one? Is it an activity of the human person as subject, or is
it itself the subject of an activity that ‘does us’, so that memoria could better
be spoken of as a sort of receptivity? Or—and this is the beginning of the quest
of the writer W.G. Sebald (1944–2001), whose work we come to treat in
some detail—is memory both at once?
In the following reﬂections and analyses we would like to set this question
in the context of a recently renewed interest in memoria in cultural theory
and the humanities, as well as of an increasing pluralism in Western societies,
which challenges the idea of a stable collective memory shared by all. For
what exactly can be shared in and as memoria? In this article we explore the
impossibility of sharing memories as a common good and a common truth,
and hope thereby to put the theme of historical responsibility, to which every
gesture of memoria is tied, in a new light (II). We will then show that the
concept of performativity, as developed in particular by Jacques Derrida through
a critical reading of Austin and Searle,2 can be a fruitful theoretical model in
the analysis of memoria and of its double status: active and receptive at the same
time. A reﬂection on the practice of testimony, again starting from Derrida,
will further articulate this coherence of performativity and memoria (III).
After this theoretical clariﬁcation of the concept of performativity, in the
three remaining sections, we test the value of this concept as a model for the
analysis of memoria. We do this through a detailed reading of Sebald’s story
‘Max Ferber’, focussing on the delicate way this story stages an impossible
testimonial drama.
First, we explain why the reading of this story—and in fact of any literary
text—is not simply an illustration of theorising. As a ‘hermeneutic drama’
between writer and reader, the story is itself both a form of performative
memoria and a reﬂection upon the performativity of memoria (IV). From this
premise we turn to the reading of Sebald’s story (V). Finally, we enquire as
to the relevance of the performative model for a theological view of memoria
and testimony (VI).
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I I . THE REV IVED CONCERN FOR MEMORIA
IN SCHOLARSH IP AND SOC IETY
Since the end of the eighties, research on memory—research that for the sake
of convenience we bring under the broad term memoria—has again been high
on the agenda of cultural scholarship. The titles of publications betray an
equally clear shift in the focus of research.3 Memory as one of the powers of
an individual consciousness is no longer the primary consideration; the main
focus of research is, rather, on the material, cultural and historical structures
and forms of representation in which and by which something like memory
becomes possible in a particular community. That is to say, memory as
technique and as politics. There are ever more studies of how particular
rhetorical techniques and strategies are used to preserve the past, or
(deliberately or not) to forget it; how what has happened is given a place,
or not. Alongside the revival of research into memoria in cultural scholarship,
there has also been a great increase in sociopolitical interest. The erection
of monuments or installations to commemorate disasters, for instance, or
genocides, is the public expression of an increasingly important culture of
commemoration; the careful collecting, archiving and exhibiting of traces
from the past has long been more than an ‘auxiliary science’. The often ﬁerce
debates on the subject (one can think of the discussion about the Holocaust-
Mahnmal in Berlin) show that reﬂection upon the modalities or forms of
remembrance, that is to say upon memory as a determined act in space, time
and language, is not a side issue, but always part of what it means to
remember. In short, the realisation is again ascendant that remembering,
and in particular memorialising, has a material and public character rather than
being the result of a solely interior process.4
We say ascendant again because the emphasis on this material, outward
character draws upon the ancient and premodern ars memoriae, the art
of remembering in which central concerns were precisely the spatiality of
memory, the localisability of what was done and lost, and the techniques
of remembering. However, whereas this premodern ars memoriae saw forgetting
as an external threat to be resisted in endlessly repeated techniques and
rituals, the most successful forms of the modern art of remembrance and
commemoration expressly attempt to build or write into all their
expressions—techniques and rituals indeed—an irremovable tension with
forgetting. In this tension we include all the sorts of limitation which beset
remembrance, from within and from without. Forgetting becomes something
unavoidable and unacceptable, and is experienced as the limit of memoria
haunting it from within.
202 DESPERATE AFFIRMATION
We began by noting a shift from individual and subjective memory as an
inner act of consciousness, to cultural and historical memory as a largely
external, spatial, public—and from there, communal—event that takes place
in acts of reading and writing. This shift is naturally related to a more
fundamental turn in the contemporary humanities, namely in philosophy. The
cultural critical reﬂections upon memoria in the work of, for instance,
Heidegger, Blanchot or Derrida form just some of the many examples of a
decentering of the individual subject. This subject has, in the course of the
last century, lost its central, all-controlling position, both through scholarly
insights into the fundamental determination of consciousness by, among
other things, language, the unconscious, social mechanisms, and the media,
and through drastic, traumatic historical events—in the ﬁrst place, not
coincidentally, the Holocaust. The new position also means that the subject
can no longer withdraw itself from the many private and collective relation-
ships, ties, networks and systems of signiﬁcation in which it is situated
and actively has to situate itself, and of which it is, in a complicated way, the
always singular result.
A New Concept of Responsibility
Various critics of this view have incorrectly posited that it leads to a situation
in which the individual could no longer be held responsible for his or her
relationship to the world, to others or to history. Individual consciousness
would only be an ‘effect’ of relations beyond the grasp or control of the
self, to which it would largely be delivered over. Furthermore, the ‘other’
historical or contemporary world would itself be simply a ‘representation’
without origin. The ﬁerce disagreements about this issue often ran and
still run along the same lines as research into memoria. For what does it
mean to remember, if the subject of that memory has no control over the
process of remembering and so does not ‘itself ’ remember, since it is being
directed by the patterns, schemes and vocabularies of the many historical
discourses in which it is inscribed; or if the thing remembered is in any case
only ‘one’ representation, the effect of all sorts of—again the same—rhetorical
strategies, narrative schemes or other mediative (ﬁlmic or photographic)
dramatisations? Is it possible to refer to anything but a ﬁctitious representation
of reality?
In the meantime the realisation has grown that the ﬁrst move towards
another view of memory lies precisely in the desperate undecidability of
these almost rhetorical questions. Together with this there arises another
concept of responsibility, no longer rooted in a ‘strong’, autonomous and
transcendental ego that decidedly (and decisively) acts in and over against
a world (including other people) which is clearly distinct as the object of
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that action.5 A close analysis of the way in which the subject is entangled or
inscribed in all sorts of networks and discourses that shape the texture
of the world and of history seems best served by a model in which the
undecidability of on the one hand autonomy (writing and reading oneself )
and on the other heteronomy (being read and written) is a structural a priori of
ﬁction and reference rather than a deﬁciency to be worked away.
I I I . PERFORMATIV ITY AS MODEL AND EVENT
In our view this model is provided by a concept that has, in recent decades,
played a groundbreaking role in language theory, in cultural scholarship
and in philosophy: that of performativity. The notion of ‘the performative’ was
given its ﬁrst philosophical formulation in 1962 by Austin, and was revised not
much later by Searle.6 Austin’s approach was from the philosophy of language:
‘It was far too long the assumption of philosophers that the business of a
‘‘statement’’ can only be to ‘‘describe some state of affairs’’, which it must
do either truly or falsely.’7 Speech acts that failed to ﬁt this model were,
according to Austin, regarded as insigniﬁcant exceptions or as ‘pseudostate-
ments’. He criticised this reductive view of speech acts and proposed a
distinction between constative utterances, which describe a state of affairs,
and utterances which are neither true nor untrue, but which ‘do’ or ‘are’
(or ‘perform’) that to which they refer: performative utterances. Opening a
meeting, making a promise or a confession, testifying to something, saying
a prayer, none of them are descriptions of some state of affairs: the speech
act is itself the action that ‘says’, in which saying and doing are one. The
truth of the utterance is not objectiﬁable; it is rather nothing other than the
reality (event, act) that is evoked.
The performative act thus disrupts the relationship of language to reality
and of words to things. It refers not to something beyond itself in order
to demonstrate its objectivity, but is its own truth and legitimacy. It is in
a fundamental sense creative and experimental, since it does not have to
be concerned with oppositions such as true and untrue, or good and bad.
Performatives thus challenge modern ideas of truth, rationality, identity and
responsibility.
Austin’s distinction, and also its revision by Searle,8 do, however, remain
indebted to a Cartesian understanding of subjectivity, in which language
is seen as the medium by which the subject makes real its intentions and
shapes the world. In contemporary philosophy and in literary scholarship the
meaning of performativity has changed utterly. Poststructuralist theory, in
particular, with its resistance to an instrumental understanding of language,9
contributed to this change. Performativity is now considered a moment,
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a situation, a relationship and an event in which the subject is always already
included, instead of a speech act where the subject stands outside.10
Performativity refers to an aporia in which every utterance and action is
trapped. On the one hand we constitute (‘perform’) the identity by which we
are able to relate to the world and can structure and order it: in doing so
we inscribe ourselves in existing discourses, where necessary changing them.
On the other hand, because we are a part of the ‘performances’ that we enact
by speaking and acting in order to be who we are, and the world to be what
it is, we can never entirely control them. Understood in this way, the
performative moment or event of our speaking and acting points towards an
original ambivalence in which autonomy and heteronomy, the construction
and the decentering of the subject, alternate and their distinction ultimately
becomes as necessary as it as untenable.
It is this performative aporia that, in our view, is an important feature
of memoria. In the performative event that, memory, every commemoration,
is, the autonomy of speech and action is interrupted or even disrupted by
a speciﬁc heteronomy: in this disruption performativity and memoria meet.
The heteronomy of reception, that is, of receiving the past, coincides with the
autonomy of action, that is, of enacting the past by memorising it. This is why
memoria, as we pointed out above, is a complex act of writing and reading acts
that, in a way, lose their ﬁrm ground as straightforward action, in order to
enter the realm between autonomy and heteronomy, that is, between activity
and receptivity. If we pursue this idea consequently, the only heteronomy—in
the sense of a radical otherness or alterity—that is left, is the heteronomy of this
event between autonomy and heteronomy. Heteronomy would then be
nothing outside this event.
Memoria and Testimony
Derrida explores this coherence of memoria and performativity by means of an
exemplifying practice: that of testimony, being one of the prime practices of
memoria.11 In a testimony, the I loses itself and touches upon the limit of its
subjectivity; the relation between act and actor, as well as between content
and event—the testiﬁed and the one who testiﬁes: the witness—is deregulated
here. According to Derrida, there cannot be a self-evident and pre-existing
I in a testimony, nor can there be an object, a ‘what’ or ‘whom’, that is to be
testiﬁed to (any particular moment or feature in the past, e.g. a person, a
victim, a tragedy, a sin, a crime, a horror). As soon as the I creates a distance
between itself and the event of the testimony, for example, by simply stating
‘I testify’, this I exonerates itself, for it says essentially: I am not the same as
what I am testifying to. According to Derrida, this distance would already
mean we refuse responsibility for the testiﬁed. There is no neutral position the
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witness could take facing the testiﬁed, no instrumental position facing his or
her testimony: we are always engaged in a complicity with what or who is
testiﬁed to. Lacking this engagement, there can be no testimony.12
In a testimony—and this points at its performative structure—one is what
one testiﬁes to, one is the event proper of the testimony. Nevertheless, one
loses oneself in the act that one executes at the same time. After a testimony
one cannot save one’s autonomous self from this loss. But neither is this self
hopelessly lost, for it afﬁrms itself in and as this loss.13
Obviously, this philosophical view on confession as an event between
autonomy and heteronomy reﬂects the structure of memoria sketched out
earlier. Every testimony is a form of performative memoria, in which some past
is re-enacted in the present, saving it from oblivion, but also—that is Derrida’s
provocative point—saving it from any attempt to reconcile with this past,
and excuse oneself. The past is inappropriable and, in a way, always
unforgivable. It has to be forgotten—it has to be remembered.
The being inﬁnite and ‘out of control’ of testimony, seen as a performative
act of memoria, this inﬁniteness also problematises Levinas’ famous duality of the
‘dit’ and the ‘dire’, the said and the saying, as developed in particular
in Otherwise than Being.14 Derrida problematises this duality by stating that,
contrary to what Levinas hopes for, there is no pure, nonviolent, absolute
saying in the sense of a pure heteronomous event, opposing the realm of
the said that would rather be the domain of the violent constitution of
identity, of the autonomous self. Testimony escapes this duality; as a
consequence, there is no pure testimony that in a way would ‘succeed’ in
doing justice to the past. Testimony’s structure of loss precludes any ‘success’.
Its ‘dire’ is always contaminated and violated15 by its ‘dit’, its performative is
always at the same time a ‘perverted’ performative.16 As we will demonstrate,
‘Max Ferber’ can be read as a long testimony testifying to this self-
contamination of testimony; the more the narrator visits, photographs, reads,
listens, the more he discovers his testimony will be a failure. His story will turn
out to be a testimony to this failure.
I V. PERFORMATIV ITY AS TEXTUAL EVENT
If we now immediately turn to the reading of a literary text, Sebald’s
‘Max Ferber’, to clarify the performative structure that we are pursuing
in memoria, then this is no merely illustrative gesture. Nowadays art and,
in particular, literature have acquired an undoubtedly central place in the
humanities as a form of reﬂection upon as well as a form of cultural
performativity. This is one of the results of the developments leading to the
revived concern for memoria that we sketched in the ﬁrst paragraph. Literary
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texts and literary criticism or ‘reading’ dramatise complex acts of writing and
reading, one might say hermeneutic dramas. In these the crucial indeterminacies
that dominate our culture are enacted and in a sense afﬁrmed. It is essential to
understand the concept of text behind this view. Text is no longer considered
a ﬁxed representation of themes and meanings; what we call ‘text’ is just
one moment in a complex process of communication, a practice that is
essentially characterised by ambivalence instead of by the classic dualisms of,
for instance, form and content, literal and ﬁgurative, fact and ﬁction, intention
and coincidence. Literary performativity, meaning the events that occur in
and through literature, is always situated between writing and reading,
between the text and the act of reading, just as religious performativity always
takes place between the ritual action and the actor. What happens in texts—
and by that we mean not only what is narrated, but the narration itself,
not only ‘le dit’ but more especially ‘le dire’, the discourse, the speech act—only
comes to light in and by the act of reading. This should not be taken to imply
that the reader simply constructs the text and its meanings or references, or
that ‘everything is ﬁction’. On the contrary, an act of reading demonstrates
the subject’s inability to come to terms either with the processes of signiﬁ-
cation or with the precise relationship to whatever historical facts may serve as
‘matter’. The reader resumes a problem of interpretation—repeating it in
an altered form. This problem takes the form of a dilemma that is already in
the text, in the tension between ‘the uttered’ and ‘the utterance’. But this
resumption can be just the event that takes the reading subject unawares,
throws him or her off balance and confronts them with an alterity—that
perhaps changes him or her self, that is to say reinscribes them and brings them
to write and read differently.
We shall now look for this hermeneutic drama throwing us off balance
in Sebald’s story ‘Max Ferber’. We discover that this remarkable text stages
such a drama in the form of an encounter with an alterity that can never be
pure otherness, and to which one can only testify in an impure way until, in
the end, the only alterity—or heteronomy—left might be this impure event,
this event of the impure, proper. We testify to alterity by testifying to the
failure of our testimony.17
V. DESPERATE AFF IRMATIONS IN W.G. SEBALD’S ‘MAX FERBER’
The textual fragment that we would now like to read is the ﬁnal passage in
the last story in the collection The Emigrants (1992) by the German-British
author W.G. Sebald (1944–2001), a story in the original edition entitled
‘Max Ferber’. It is beyond the framework of this paper to give a complete
introduction to the author and his works. Sufﬁce it to say that Sebald’s work
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has very quickly become one of the most discussed examples of contemporary
memoria literature and that The Emigrants and Sebald’s last novel, Austerlitz
(2001), which in a sense form a single work, are the main reason for this.
Sebald’s oeuvre is a kaddish for a world that seems to have been irrevocably
destroyed by the Holocaust. Nevertheless, this world is fascinatingly evoked
and ‘performed’ for us: and not only for us, but in a sense from our
perspective, that is to say, the perspective of those who were not there and
have to carry on regardless. We were not there and the real witnesses are
dying off, or silent, or severely traumatised. But Sebald turns this historical
consequence into a more fundamental one: time or history confronts us with
the fact that writing on and after the Holocaust and testifying to it has always
been writing on an ‘event-without-witness’.18 The survivors—actually every-
one who lives after the Holocaust—are consigned to a belatedness and
de-location that can only be repeated. This repetition is at the heart of
the literary performative that enacts the hermeneutic drama of (failed)
commemoration.19 As the title of the collection The Emigrants suggests, the
main characters are always more or less exiles who escaped the inferno of the
Holocaust. In the stories of ‘Max Ferber’ and Austerlitz another speciﬁcally
historical dimension is added: in each case their parents sent them to England
as children before the outbreak of war, the one from Germany, the other from
Czechoslovakia (in Austerlitz’s case on one of the infamous Kindertransporte).
They never saw their parents again. By adoption they were given a second life
in which the past, including their mother tongue, was either erased or faded
away, until it catches up with them again and pitches them into deep
melancholy and depression, madness or suicide. These micro-histories are
reconstructed by a narrator who travels both across the European continent
and through the places of exile in England and the USA. He visits and
photographs people, places, buildings, cemeteries; he archives everything—
including apparently insigniﬁcant souvenirs; he describes and photographs
objects of which the function is no longer always clear; he reads letters, diaries,
books, newspapers and magazines, making excerpts and summaries; he does a
lot of listening and bears witness to what he has heard, but seldom gets to
the bottom of the loss in the lives of those who themselves are wrestling with
the dark emptiness in their memory.
Between, on the one hand, the historical reality that was what it
was and from which, despite the many historical documents, we are
irrevocably separated, and on the other, the attempts, well-meaning or not, to
put ourselves into that world by means of, for example, literature or ﬁlm,
Sebald writes his texts. These are burdened with a weight of historical
material, but at the same time they inscribe the remains and traces of the past
in a close-knit network of ﬁctionalised structures. This undermines the illusion
of an unproblematic empathy and historical representation, and at the same
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time confronts the reader with hermeneutic problems that are far from merely
academic. The reader is drawn into the aforementioned hermeneutic drama
that is also that of the narrators in Sebald’s works, and which is thus already
itself dramatised in the text.
What is ‘Max Ferber’ about? What sort of text is it? As is usual in Sebald’s
work, the story is told by a ﬁrst-person narrator whose biography makes it
difﬁcult not to identify him with Sebald himself. In a few cases this is
reinforced by photographs or other documents. ‘Max Ferber’ begins, not
coincidentally, with the hallucinatory and probably largely autobiographical
evocation of the night-time ﬂight that carried the narrator from Germany to
Manchester in the Autumn of 1966. The city repeatedly appears in the story
as a ghost-town full of ruins, ‘a necropolis or mausoleum’, although in the
19th century it was the centre of the cloth industry, ‘the industrial Jerusalem’.
This is a reference to the fact that long before the Holocaust, Manchester
was already a city of immigrants, and ﬂourished in some part because of the
numerous (mainly German) Jews in the city.
In this city the narrator meets—without the immediate occasion of the
meeting becoming apparent—a painter of German origin, Max Ferber.
Penetrating pages follow about the obsessional aesthetics of the tormented
Ferber in actu: not creating, but scrapping, scraping away, painting over or
redrawing, deleting and destroying are central to the artist’s work. Ferber
sees the ominously accumulating charcoal dust that gets everywhere as ‘the
true product of his continuing endeavours and the most palpable proof of
his failure’. Nevertheless, his portraits, which emerge as though by accident,
arouse in the viewer the impression ‘that it had evolved from a long lineage
of grey, ancestral faces, rendered unto ash but still there, as ghostly presences,
on the harried paper’.
By a textual procedure that is also used in Austerlitz, a ﬁrst series of meetings,
in which the work of the main character is the focus of attention, is followed
by a gap of about 20 years. Then comes a second series of meetings between
narrator and painter, with intense conversations which almost have the
character of psychoanalytic sessions. While Ferber had been very reserved
about his origins 20 years before, now the narrator has to listen to the stream
of memories largely concerning the circumstances around Ferber’s leave-
taking from his parents in 1939. At the end of these conversations Ferber gives
the narrator a packet of loose sheets containing his mother’s diary entries, in
which she barely touches on the ever clearer calamity, and writes all the
more and with moving meticulousness about her almost idyllic childhood, as
though she knew that something was about to happen that would destroy
that world forever. By reading and summarising the hundreds of sheets of
entries, the narrator is for the ﬁrst time truly gripped by Ferber’s story, but his
attempts to write it, he admits, are a failure.
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There is a noticeable and signiﬁcant analogy between Ferber’s dramatic
and drastic aesthetics of deletion and painting over, and the narrator’s process
of writing: ‘I had covered hundreds of pages with my scribble, in pencil
and ballpoint. By far the greater part had been crossed out, discarded, or
obliterated by additions. Even what I ﬁnally salvaged as a ‘‘ﬁnal version’’,
seemed to me a thing of shreds and patches, utterly botched.’ This failure is
all the more poignant because the narrator is confronted with a constant
‘mental impoverishment and lack of memory’ in Germany, and not only at
a visit to Bad Kissingen, where Ferber’s family once lived, but also because
Ferber himself is, at the end of the story, literally left speechless by a lung
infection. This burdens the narrator with a responsibility of which he despairs.
Ferber’s memories cannot be commemorated and afﬁrmed in a successful
gesture of memoria. All that remains is desperate afﬁrmation.
The issue that the story deals with culminates in a ﬁnal scene which requires
careful reading. The narrator wanders through the dilapidated, empty streets
and neighbourhoods of a ghostly Manchester, and takes a room in the
once legendarily luxurious Midlands hotel, now ‘on the brink of ruin’. The
hallucinatory atmosphere in the dusty and abandoned 19th-century palace
of the moneyed makes the narrator, upon entering his room, ‘think myself
in a Polish city’. The memory of an exhibition that he had visited in Frankfurt
a year before explains the association; it was an exhibition about the
Litzmannstadt Ghetto, set up in 1940 in the Polish ‘industrial metropolis Lo´dz,
once known as polski Manczester ’. The exhibition displayed colour photo-
graphs that had indeed turned up in a Viennese antique shop in 1987, and
were the work of a certain Genewein, the German accountant of the ghetto,
who had furthermore taken a shot of himself ‘counting money at his bureau’.
The other photos are sometimes portraits of German civilians or soldiers
and high dignitaries, usually taken in family groups or at parties, but otherwise
primarily photos concerning the ‘exemplary organisation within the ghetto’:
‘the postal system, the police, the courtroom, the ﬁre brigade, the sewer
system etc.’; ﬁnally, there are photos documenting ‘our industry’—the forced
labour in the ghetto:
Work is our only course, it was said. – Behind the perpendicular frame of a loom
sit three young women, perhaps aged twenty. The irregular geometrical pattern
of the carpet they are knotting, and even its colours, remind me of the settee in
our living room at home. Who the young women are I do not know. The light
falls on them from the window in the background, so I cannot make out their
eyes clearly, but I sense that all three of them are looking across at me, since I am
standing at the very spot where the accountant stood with his camera. The young
woman in the middle is blonde and has the air of a bride about her. The weaver
to her left has inclined her head a little to one side, whilst the woman on her right
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is looking at me with so steady and relentless a gaze that I cannot meet it for long.
I wonder what the three women’s names were – Roza, Lusia and Lea, or Nona,
Decuma and Morta, the daughters of night, with spindle, thread and scissors.
This closing tableau is intriguing and irritating because the reader is confused
by a choreography of gazes and the textual staging. The photograph—
incidentally one that really exists—was not included in the book. It shows,
in Roland Barthes’ formulation, ‘what has been’ and what is locked within
that silenced, past, futureless moment that would make catharsis and
transformation impossible. But still the narrator does not stop at this historical
situatedness; he shows that the photograph is not or not only a ‘view of
something’, but especially also ‘something as viewed’, to use Susan Sontag’s
distinction. The description transﬁgures the poignant factuality and anonymity
of that which is depicted, constructs a relationship between the portrait and
its maker, and guesses about names that do not so much personalise or
individualise as ultimately shift the singular, historical (‘what has been’) to a
mythological level. It is a procedure that seems as old as art and literature
themselves: the transformation, the ‘ennoblement’ of the mortal and singular
in the eternal and universal of the work of art.
Two Perversions in the Text
But this view of the position of the artist and the function of art is severely
taken to task in ‘Max Ferber’, and unmasked as a ﬁrst perversion. The narrator
cannot but take the place of the accountant-photographer. In this sense
he compromises himself as viewer of the photograph, but also on another
level, namely as narrator/writer of this story. The perversity consists in the ﬁrst
place of the almost blasphemous reversal of roles that this mythologisation
performs. For the young women at the loom are not the incarnations
of fate; they do not dispose and are not almighty subjects determining
the course and length of human lives. They are, quite the contrary,
literally disposed as objects for the eye of the photographer, who requisitions
their gaze, allows them to look up ‘purposely and solely for fraction of a
second that it took to take the photograph’, as the text says. The gazes
involved here do not document a moment of intersubjectivity, an exchange
of glances, but are a being-exposed, an exposure to a technically calculated
grid. The photographs made ‘zu Erinnerungszwecken’ (as souvenirs) have little
to do with memoria; they ‘document’ only ‘our industry’ as the Nazis did all
the time.
It is no coincidence that the photographer is an accountant, who is himself
portrayed on one of the photographs ‘while counting money at his desk’.
It is he who is really a representative and executive of the fate that is no mythic
doom, but a machinery of destruction constructed and directed by human
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beings: the exemplary internal organisation of death that Nazi ideologues
such as Goebbels described as a work of art. Because the reader is in a certain
sense dependent on this perspective and almost of necessity has to identify
with the gaze of the narrator, he or she is also drawn into this ‘conspiracy’.
The indirect and implicit identiﬁcation of the accountant (‘Rechnungsfu¨hrer’)
as an apparently innocent representative of what, since Hannah Arendt’s
account of the Eichmann trial, has been deﬁned as the banality of evil, now
touches the narrator, the writer and the reader. They too, we too, apparently
continue to write this story of the banalisation of evil.20
Even so, the mythological naming articulates a second perversion that
disrupts the simple reversal of the scheme of sublimation and thus further
distorts the outrageous reversal of roles. For the description of (the viewing of )
the photograph leads to a mythological naming; this gesture is, however,
the result of an incident, an incapacity of the narrator/viewer to return
the gaze. ‘The steady and relentless gaze’ of the third young woman is
a surprise, since the narrator cannot really see her back-lit eyes. The
back lighting breaks the horizon of the viewer’s gaze, only to open another
space that pushes the observing subject out of the role of sovereign and
self-contained observer. This viewer becomes the ‘viewed’, without at
ﬁrst being able to look (back). This gaze is unbearable, because the subject
is subjected in an uncontrollable way, and cannot return the gaze that
comes out of the back lighting. The other/Other looks with eyes that
the subject cannot see, let alone answer. The eyes must be cast down or
averted in shame.
Morta, the name of the third woman, is in Greek Atropos. This literally
means: the inescapable (death), impossible to ‘see’ and ‘not to see’, that is
to say: the undeniable; but also: that for which no images or tropes are
ﬁtting, so that narration itself is interrupted and cut short. Finally, weaving
is a well-established metaphor for writing. That the woman in the photograph
herself brings about the end of the story, interrupting gaze and word,
perhaps signiﬁes a ﬁnal moment of heteronomy for narrator and reader.
But what could be (and indeed is) a radical critique of the manipulated
gaze of the photographer, the viewer, the narrator and the reader, might
itself be stage-managed by the writer. Is he not the god who stands above
the Fates and allows them to cut the thread? Is this an underhand self-
legitimisation through a self-staging of guilt, a reversal of the conﬁguration of
victim and criminal? And to drive the desperation to the ultimate point: is
the reference to the geometrical and pictorial similarity of the cloth woven
by the women and that of the household sofa (for which, incidentally, there
are parallels in the mythological sources about the Fates) not an ultimate
afﬁrmation of fatalism: this had to be, you there, me here? Or does it rather
mean: it should or might have been me there? But then, where?
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The intangible ambivalence of this scene, leaving us with these questions,
appears to convey to us how problematic the idea of a ‘ﬁnal’ moment of
heteronomy, of the sudden revelation of a pure other, is. ‘Reﬂecting’ in its
own, unique way upon this problem, Sebald’s text enters the performative
realm between autonomy and heteronomy we articulated earlier, teaching
us that testifying to violence can only be a radical practice of memoria if it
opens itself to the event of its failure. In failing, testimony exposes itself
as a practice of indecisive, desperate afﬁrmation: it afﬁrms the structure of
the ‘not yet’, of the ‘still to come’.
Returning once more to the very beginning of this article—the motto that
is also the motto of the ﬁrst story in The Emigrants, ‘Zersto¨ret das Letzte / die
Erinnerung nicht’—this undecidability becomes obvious in still another way.
Is it just an appeal to remember instead of erasing the traces of the past; or
should it be read as a desperate rhetorical question that is itself ambiguous?
Is memory, that is, the past, not always destroyed by what comes after it,
the old erased by the new? But the question and the appeal are at least
complementary: the desperate question makes the appeal necessary. However,
both the English and the French translation—‘And the last remnants/memory
destroys’; ‘Et le reste n’est il pas / par le souvenir de´truit’—are based on a
completely different interpretation (in collaboration with Sebald himself ),
locating the danger of destruction in the act of memory itself. Does memory—as
an autonomous performative act—not erase the traces of the past, the
traces of otherness, by inscribing them into a story that ‘makes sense’ or—as
is the case at the end of ‘Max Ferber’—by inscribing them into a mytho-
logical or allegorical frame? How can we memorise the otherness of the past
without appropriating it? Should we then try to subvert our own act of
memorisation?
However, if this event of failure is the only heteronomy ‘Max Ferber’
leaves to us, what remains of the word and ﬁgure of ‘God’ but a ‘singular
performative instant’,21 what of religion but a continuous and continuously
failing testimony—in writing and reading, in imagination and experience—to
this instant? How would this performative instant interrupt the religious
traditions we are part of and, more in particular, the Judeo-Christian traditions
of memoria passionis, of remembering the suffering and ‘failing’ of God in
Christ? In the ﬁnal section we shall set out preliminaries for a certain theological
response that is provoked by our analyses thus far.
V I . MEMORIA PASSIONIS
In an essay on the German writer Johann Peter Hebel (1760–1826), Sebald
paraphrases a story of a boy and his father, passing a ruined castle.22 The father
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answers in the afﬁrmative when the boy asks whether the same will happen
to their house; the same will even happen to the city of Basel, and to the
whole world. The boy, the father says, will after this life go to a city in the
stars if he behaves himself. From there he will see the then scorched and
ruined earth and see all the places where he was, where he played, where he
lived, felt safe and happy. Thus Hebel changes the naive image of an eternal
‘happily ever after’ into one of perpetual awareness of loss. Sebald paraphrases
how in Hebel’s story there is a former schoolmate pointing out to the boy
the places of irreparable destruction: memoria as remembrance of what will
never be healed. Sebald seems to identify strongly with this boy and with
Hebel as the narrator of this story.
How is Memoria (Im)possible? Rosenzweig and Benjamin
In his Star of Redemption, Jewish philosopher Franz Rosenzweig (1886–1929)
writes on the performance of the Jewish Day of Atonement:
The individual in all his naked individuality stands immediately before God.
Only his human sin is named in the moving recital of the sins ‘which we have
sinned’, a recital which is far more than mere recital. It shines into the
most hidden corners of being. [. . .] And so ‘We’ in whose community the
individual recognises his sin can be nothing less than the congregation of
mankind itself.23
Just as Rosenzweig considers the Jews in their confessions of guilt on
Yom Kippur to represent humankind, Sebald in his performances of failing
memoria represents the human condition in the history in which the Great
Destruction (Shoa) of the Jewish people could happen and has happened.
However, in Rosenzweig’s philosophy the Jewish position of being
aware before God of sin and guilt depends on God’s redemption through
God’s love: this love is, in the words of Solomon’s Song of Songs (8:6), ‘strong
as death’. The weaknesses of human attempts to realise a good life can be
realistically considered and human guilt can be admitted, because they are
always encompassed in God’s life-enhancing love. This is precisely why,
according to post-holocaust Jewish philosopher Emil Fackenheim, ‘(to)
mention the accursed name of Hitler is to awaken from Rosenzweig’s
thought—profoundly philosophical, profoundly Jewish, profoundly
modern—as if, nevertheless, from a dream’. In Auschwitz and the other
death camps, the Jewish experience that Divine love is strong as death, and
that in any catastrophe a remnant remains that continues the presence of
God’s people in history, broke down.24
How then is memoria possible? Jewish thinker Walter Benjamin, one of
the main inspirations of Sebald, reverses the question, suggesting how memoria
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is impossible. In the ninth of his famous theses ‘On the Concept of History’,
Benjamin describes the angel of history:
His face is turned toward the past. Where we perceive a chain of events, he sees
one single catastrophe which keeps piling wreckage and hurls it in front of
his feet. The angel would like to stay, awaken the dead, and make whole what
has been smashed. But a storm is blowing in from Paradise; it has got caught
in his wings with such a violence that the angel can no longer close them.
The storm irresistibly propels him into the future to which his back is turned,
while the pile of debris before him grows skyward. This storm is what we call
progress.25
By making use of the image of the angel of history, Benjamin locates his
reﬂections on memoria in a religious space. Memoria is for Benjamin an almost
ascetic religious praxis, breaking away from what he calls the ‘politicians’
stubborn faith in progress’, while the angel of history turns his back to the
future that is born from this faith in progress. At the same time, however, even
the angel cannot resist the force of progress, He cannot remain with those
who died and with what has been smashed, as he should in order to truly
become the messianic presence of the Divine in history.26 In this way,
Benjamin’s angel of history performs memoria as an impossibility, just as
Sebald does. But, in Benjamin’s case at least, it is a messianic impossibility.
Rethinking the Tradition of Memoria Passionis: Metz
Trying to reﬂect sincerely on the situation of this tradition ‘after Auschwitz’
and following Benjamin’s suggestions, Catholic theologian Johann Baptist
Metz has focussed on the tradition of the memoria passionis as the core of
the Christian messianic tradition. Of course, memory has always been at
the very heart of Catholic Christianity. ‘Haec quotiescumque feceritis, in mei
memoriam facietis’: ‘as often as you will do this, you will do it in remembrance
of me’. These words traditionally ending the consecration in the so-called
Roman Canon that was, between the Tridentine and the Second Vatican
Councils, in the centre of the Roman Catholic celebration of the Eucharist,
focus on the performance of memoria. It is not so much the duty or the task
of the Church as the Christian community to remember, but the Church
exists by and through an act that is and comes from remembrance—the ritual
of the Eucharist is itself a memoria to its installation by Jesus—and calls
forth remembrance. It is a form of remembrance ﬁrst of all of the life and
death, resurrection and gloriﬁcation of Jesus, but through the remembrance
of his history it is also the remembrance of the whole of the history of God
with human beings. In the Eucharist, in the remembrance of Jesus’ death
at the cross, ‘the work of our redemption is carried out’ and ‘the unity of the
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believers, who form one body in Christ, is both expressed and brought
about’.27 Memoria represents what is remembered and creates the community
that, united in what she remembers, is able to remember.28
Metz has placed this memoria passionis in the centre of Christian theology
and practice. In Metz’s view it is the task of Christians to remember the history
of Jesus’ suffering, and in this history all the unredeemed and unatoned
suffering that characterises human history as a whole. Memoria passionis is a
‘critical memory’ according to Metz, in breaking the illusion that our world
and our history are what they are supposed to be or, religiously speaking, that
we live simply and straightforwardly in God’s world.29 Using Benjamin’s
notion that what we usually call progress is the storm blowing from paradise
into the future, heaping up the corpses of the victims it leaves behind, Metz
sees the memoria of Jesus’ suffering as a memoria to a representative of these
victims our history makes us forget.30 After Auschwitz, and confronted with
the dangers of forgetfulness, Metz considers it to be theology’s task to
contribute to what he calls a culture of anamnesis, ‘eine anamnetische Kultur’.31
According to Metz, memoria passionis only makes sense, and ultimately is only
possible, if the lives of those who suffer are restored by and in God. This has a
double consequence. Firstly, it means that where memoria is successful, this is a
sign and a real presence of the victory of life over death; the Christian tradition
attributes this sign to the resurrection of Jesus from the death. Whenever
Sebald—or anyone else—successfully breaks down the culture of amnesia and
contributes to a culture of anamnesis, from the point of view of Metz’s
theology this means an anticipation of the ultimate victory of love over death
Judaism and Christianity both hope for.32 Secondly, whenever Sebald makes
clear how memoria can only be performed as impossible and necessarily reveals
its own failure at the very moment it is successful, from the point of Metz’s
theology this is a sign that God is still awaited.
Although Metz sometimes seems to think that the performance of memoria
passionis is simply a matter of voluntary resistance to the culture of amnesia,
ultimately it is for him a praxis of sharing in suffering. Metz pleads for
a Christology of the suffering and dead Christ, a Christology of Good Friday.
This means that we cannot be united with Jesus, and through him with God,
by sharing his glory after his resurrection, but only by sharing his suffering and
death and by thus awaiting the redemption that is proclaimed to be coming.33
Emil Fackenheim discusses how after Auschwitz the Christian idea of
a death of God also has become part of Jewish thought. It should, he says,
by no means be a way to surrender to despair. That would be a sin against
what he considers to be the commanding voice of Auschwitz that forbids
Jews ‘to hand Hitler posthumous victories’ and compels them to ‘survive as
Jews’. For Fackenheim, the fact that ‘for nearly two thousand years [the Jews]
have resisted the Christian Good News even at the price of continued exile,
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it has been because acceptance seemed a betrayal of the Jewish post so long
as this world was unredeemed’.34
From Metz Back to Sebald
Sebald’s performance of memoria as an impossible act can be rephrased
in Metz’s language as an ongoing memory that the world is still unredeemed
in two ways: it remembers the unredeemed and their usually forgotten or
suppressed histories, and it remembers the impossibility to truly remember
and thus redeem them, even for the time of the performance of the memoria.
In Metz’s vision, the Christian message is ultimately not a message of
redemption: that would be a denial of the world being unredeemed. Precisely
in its memoria passionis the Christian tradition remembers this very fact. Thus
it is actively waiting and hoping for redemption. In performing memoria
passionis, the believer becomes part of the redemption that is only present sub
contrario in the performance of memoria itself: ‘Haec quotiescumque feceritis, in mei
memoriam facietis’.
The point here, of course, is not to Christianise Sebald, memoria, or the
Jewish experience. The point is to show how memoria passionis as thought
by Metz is one of those concepts from the religious traditions that begs
for translation in today’s secularised culture. In 2001, the year of 9/11,
Ju¨rgen Habermas suggested that religious traditions reserve important notions
that have not fully become part of the culture of late modernity. Therefore,
a continuous translation of religious notions in late modernity’s secularised
culture is an important task, not only for representatives of religious traditions
but also for secular intellectuals.35 It is the religious concept of memoria passionis
that helps to understand the aporia present in the performance of memoria.
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